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Abstract
Cost growth above inflation (CGAI) is the cost growth that exists after adjusting
for the effects of currency inflation over time. The time value of money would suggest
the increase in Operating and Support (O&S) costs over time would only be affected by
inflation. In essence, every year aircraft need to be maintained at the same level and O&S
costs should not change, assuming the same level of requirements. If CGAI exists in
O&S there will be a large inaccuracy in the total life cycle cost (LCC) of weapon systems
and an inaccurate budget put in place. An inaccurate estimate of O&S costs lead to
budgeting problems and creates future budget issues.
This study begins an exploration of CGAI and attempts to measure the
relationship of the cost growth to unaccounted increases in raw material cost.
Specifically, an evaluation CGAI through an analysis of raw material costs from a period
of 2000 to 2012 for Air Force aircraft. Raw material costs ideally should only be affected
by inflation, and thus any cost growth beyond inflation indicates a problem. A better
understanding of inflation-adjusted cost growth provides understanding why O&S cost
continues to increase beyond the rate of inflation.
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Cost Growth Above Inflation (CGAI) in Operating and Support (O&S) Costs in Raw
Materials for Air Force Aircraft
I. Introduction
Background
The Department of Defense (DoD) ensures a level of national security and safety
for the American people by maintaining current weapon systems and funding
development of future weapon systems. Recent Congressional limitations on the national
defense budget coupled with ever increasing defense costs have created a difficult
financial environment to ensure the defense readiness and security of our nation.
Thorough planning and prioritization of resources in the face of a declining budget is just
as crucial to our national defense as the weapons. As Admiral Mullens, the Chairmen of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, “continually increasing debt is the biggest threat we have
to our national security.” (O’Keefe, 2011).
To force a reduction of deficit spending, the US Congress passed the Budget
Control Act of 2011. The act calls for a committee to produce legislation providing a
deficit reduction in the Congressional Budget in the amount of $1.2 trillion, and if no
plan is successfully drafted the DoD will incur approximately half of the cuts. According
to the Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, maximum sequestration of the defense budget
would result in cuts of roughly $100 billion a year and force a mass reduction in the size
of the military (O’Keefe, 2011).
The wary fiscal environment and the unknown future of the defense budget put a
renewed importance on presenting accurate total life cycle costs (LCC) for weapon
systems. LCC are the “cradle to grave” costs of a weapon system and are crucial for
1

decision makers (Office of Secretary of Defense, 2003). In order to formulate a national
defense strategy the decision makers must know the level of capabilities that can be
afforded. The LCC cost estimates help to set the guideline for future costs and set the
foundation for shaping the affordability of the national defense’s future capability. The
inaccuracy of LCC cost estimates affects the implementation of our defense strategy and
hinders the execution of our forces. The largest portion of LCC come from operating and
support (O&S) costs; history indicates O&S account for 70% or more of the total life
cycle cost (GAO, 2000).
O&S encompasses all program costs from the time of initial system deployment
through the end of operation. This includes all sustainment costs for a weapon system,
which include operating, maintaining and supporting a fielded system (DoD CAIG,
2007). With over 70% of LCC accounted for in O&S there is great importance in
ensuring O&S estimates accurately model raw material demand, personnel requirements,
facilities, training, configuration management, engineering support, reliability growth and
maintenance costs. Decision makers must be confident the LCC costs are accurate when
planning future defense strategies because they often have to balance cost with capability.
Once a weapon’s system O&S budget is estimated for the initial rollout of a
program, future costs are extrapolated by adjusting for currency inflation. Audits
evaluating O&S budget allocations have illustrated that this method is under-predicting
future O&S costs. From 1996 to 2011 O&S costs rose by 6% per year, 4.3% greater than
general inflation (SAF FMCC/FMBP, 2012). Cost growth above inflation (CGAI) is the
cost growth that exists after adjusting for the effects of currency inflation over time. The
time value of money would suggest the increase in O&S costs over time would only be
2

affected by inflation. In essence, every year aircraft need to be maintained at the same
level and O&S costs should not change, assuming the same level of requirements.
If CGAI exists in O&S there will be a large inaccuracy in the total LCC of
weapon systems and an inaccurate budget put in place. An inaccurate estimate of O&S
costs lead to budgeting problems and creates future budget issues. If future budgets are
not accurately put in place there is a potential decision makers will have to cancel
funding on programs in order to pay for O&S costs of current programs. Increasing O&S
costs are must-pay bills and could force the DoD to reduce research and development
(R&D) efforts in order to pay for the current fleet.
The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) is a data warehouse, which is fed
by fourteen sources (Kunc, 2008). One of the financial sources feeding AFTOC is the
Standard Base Supply System (SBSS). SBSS is “a computerized system to account for
supplies and equipment at the base level” (USAF Supply Manual, 2012). AFTOC
contains actual costs of all major Air Force weapons systems, and is used to help satisfy
congressional reporting of O&S costs (Kunc, 2008). This study uses AFTOC to collect
actual cost data. By using AFTOC, fed by SBSS, the database allows for evaluation of
O&S costs of weapon platforms at the line replaceable unit (LRU) level. The evaluation
of CGAI takes place at the LRU level for Air Force aircraft. The data set from AFTOC
contains 32,765 unique national item identification numbers (NIINs). The data set
provides a complete base level inventory of purchases for 103 different Air Force aircraft.

3

Problem
The Congressional Budget Committees rely on accurate cost estimates from the
Air Force to determine budget allocations and prioritize DoD capability expenditures. As
O&S costs increase beyond inflation the estimates are not accurately predicting budget
requirements for current programs. The ability to accurately show the LCC cost of
program greatly relies on the accuracy of the O&S estimate. If cost estimators fail to
adjust for CGAI, senior leaders and decision makers will inadequately allocate resources.
There are several potential areas where there may be CGAI. Potential areas
where CGAI may exist include: raw materials, operational requirements, aircraft age,
workforce skills, maintenance practices, military compensation, civilian compensation,
and fuel costs. This research looks at the raw material costs, and the accuracy of the
inflation indices. Specifically, we evaluate CGAI through an analysis of raw material
costs from a period of 2000 to 2012 for Air Force aircraft. Raw material costs ideally
should only be affected by inflation, and thus any cost growth beyond inflation indicates
a problem.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has emphasized that a better
understanding of spending on equipment, including raw materials, “would aid the
Congress and DoD officials in understanding the role that equipment costs play in driving
total spending” (US Congressional Budget Office, 2001). The current uncertainty
surrounding the existence of cost escalation of raw materials requires new research to
quantitatively measure the effect of this cost growth. By analyzing a large inventory of
LRU cost variations over a period of time, the influence of product specific trends are
minimized and a general change in raw material cost can be estimated. This fundamental
4

exploration of changing prices will aid understanding and defining CGAI and allow for a
uniform method of O&S cost estimating to be developed.

Purpose of this Study
This study explores CGAI and attempts to measure the relationship of the cost
growth to unaccounted increases in raw material cost. The efforts in this thesis aim to
answer the following questions:
1) Are raw material costs a source of CGAI?
2) Do the DoD inflation indices accurately account for inflation?
3) Should an adjustment factor be applied to raw material costs?
Under tighter financial restrictions the DoD will require greater accuracy of O&S
cost estimates. Today’s acquisitions involve a significant future financial commitment
and the DoD needs to ensure the future commitments are accurately being estimated
(GAO, 2012). Raw materials, or equipment, are a vital component of O&S and
fundamental to the cost to operate weapon systems. Exploring the influence of raw
materials in O&S costs, and the existence of rising cost over time is crucial to identifying
where CGAI exist. This thesis attempts to identify if raw materials costs are increasing
beyond the rate of inflation and the accuracy of O&S inflation indices. Identifying if raw
materials are generating cost growth above inflation helps decision makers now
appropriately budget for the increasing costs. This also is crucial to portfolio analysis and
it could change decisions on continuing further development versus modernization.

5

Study Process
The study process begins with background information on what CGAI is and how
it is measured. A clear understanding of the different ways O&S cost growth and the
effects of inflation are evaluated. A better understanding of inflation-adjusted cost growth
provides the ability to begin applying the effects of raw material and inflation indices on
increasing O&S costs. Raw material is a key component to understanding why O&S cost
continues to increase beyond the rate of inflation.
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I provides background on the
importance of weapon systems cost estimation in relation to Air Force and DoD budgets.
Chapter II presents a more detailed background of previous O&S cost estimating and
CGAI. Past research is analyzed and dissected allowing the reader to gain a historical
perspective and establishing a plan on new ways to examine the problem. This literature
review leads to Chapter III where the methodology of the research is made clear. The
methodology will provide the framework to be followed in conducting the research on
CGAI. In Chapter IV the results of the research are presented to the reader. Chapter V
provides a summary and conclusion of the research analysis, along with recommendation
for future research.

6

II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter explores the historical existence of cost growth above inflation for
O&S costs of the DoD. Measuring cost growth is traditionally done as a ratio of an early
LCC estimate to the current estimate or the actual final cost of a program (Arena,
Leonard, Murray, & Younossi, 2006). Inadequacies in O&S estimates led to a General
Accounting Office (GAO) investigation into the accuracy of O&S estimates. This report
found that “estimated weapon system O&S costs are often inconsistent and sometimes
unreliable, limiting visibility needed for effective oversight of these costs” (GAO, 2012).
The necessity to provide consistency in O&S cost estimates requires a more thorough
understanding and application of cost growth above inflation.
This discussion begins with an exploration of reports and studies that examine the
existence of cost growth above inflation. Studies have shown the existence of an
inflation-adjusted cost growth in DoD weapons programs, but have not identified the root
cause. After examining cost growth above inflation the discussion moves to the factors
that cause non-inflation growth in O&S.
Next, the research on inflation indexes used within the DoD and the resultant
accuracy in estimation is evaluated. It is critical to examine how the DoD adjusts for
inflation to accurately interpret the CGAI. Following is a breakdown of the different
methods for accounting for cost growth above inflation in O&S estimates. Following the
discussion of previous research is a brief conclusion of the literature review.

7

Cost Growth Above Inflation
Inflation
To begin to comprehend the nuances involved in cost growth above inflation
requires a careful look at inflation. Inflation is an economic phenomenon that explains the
increasing price of goods and services over time (Blanchard, 2000). This phenomenon
can easily be mistaken as cost growth, but a careful differentiation should be made. It
makes sense the cost to operate and maintain weapon systems, specifically aircraft, will
cost more in the future because of the price of the goods and services on which the O&S
costs are based rise with inflation. This issue is not worrisome to estimators and decision
makers, as long as the increasing prices are following the anticipated change in inflation.
The increasing prices to maintain and operate aircraft become troublesome when the cost
growth exceeds that of the rate of inflation. The growth experienced after accounting for
the effects of inflation will be defined as the cost growth above inflation.
Cost Growth
The discussion of cost growth in weapons acquisitions is not a new or recent
development. The desire to garner a more comprehensive understanding of defense
acquisition, and specifically cost estimating, is evident from more than 130 studies and
commissions that were accomplished since World War II (DoD, 2009). Of those studies,
dozens relate to the accuracy of cost estimating (Ryan, et al, 2012). The collective goal of
all of these studies is to try and eliminate the error in cost estimates and underreporting of
expected expenditures. A RAND study exploring the sources of cost growth succinctly
defined cost growth as, “the ratio of a weapon system’s current estimate of cost to that of
some earlier estimate” (Hough, 1992). For the purposes of this study cost growth will
8

similarly be defined; however, instead of estimates we will be dealing with actual cost
totals reported to the GAO.

CGAI
Mistakenly, authors use CGAI to suggest a failure in cost estimating to accurately
anticipate increasing costs caused from inflation. CGAI instead suggests something
within the original estimate is increasing at a rate beyond the anticipated inflation for the
item. It is premature to assume the inability to accurately predict cost growth is due to
inflation estimator error or faulty use of the DoD inflation indices. In fact, the
unexplained cost growth above inflation may imply the requirements, or resources, of
operating and maintaining aircraft increases over the entire life cycle of the program.
In 2001, The United States Congressional Budget Office (CBO) investigated the
existence of cost growth above inflation. The Congressional study called for a look at the
increasing cost of maintenance to aircraft. In the study the CBO found the appearance of
cost growth above inflation. More specifically, the study found evidence that the cost to
maintain aircraft was increasing each year, even after adjusting for inflation (US
Congressional Budget Office, 2001). The CBO study looked at the increasing
sustainment costs using two different methods. The study expressly looked at the rising
costs in Operation and Maintenance (O&M). O&M is one of the components that
comprise the overarching O&S costs. Besides O&M, O&S costs include military
personal costs (MILPERS), but no disposal costs (DAU, 2012). The study found cost
growth above inflation in O&M of 1 to 3 percent, per year (US Congressional Budget
Office, 2001). The CBO did not provide any comments to the root cause of the rise in
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cost above the rate of general inflation. The study used both the Navy’s Visibility and
Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) to pull O&S data, and the Air
Force’s AFTOC system. The study only looked at major defense acquisition programs
(MDAP), and both findings were statistically significant.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) also looked into the existence of
increasing cost to maintain existing DoD weapon systems. The OSD Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation (CAPE) performed a study investigating increasing costs. The
study found CGAI to be between 2-3% on DoD weapons systems (Anderson, 2012). The
study used the DoD deflators to calculate how much annual growth was seen in DoD
weapon systems after adjusting for inflation. This study compared the percentage of cost
growth in O&S over time, versus the percentage of growth in inflation over the same
period. However, it fails to identify the root causes for this cost growth. Without digging
into the actual expenditures in O&S cost there is little insight into the contributing factors
of CGAI.

Raw Materials
There are many different parts that make up maintenance costs of an airplane.
The foundation of sustaining an aircraft is ensuring the aircraft has properly maintained
parts. The raw materials used in the maintenance process are a source of O&S costs. The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that nine percent of the total O&M budget is
spent on replacement equipment, which equates to $9.6 billion annually (US

Congressional Budget Office, 2001). Raw materials make up the parts on the aircraft
that ensure it is operational and ready for it’s mission. Individual aircraft parts may seem
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trivial, but these raw materials make up a substantial portion of total maintenance costs.
Approximately 20 percent of total O&M spending is comprised of raw materials (US

Congressional Budget Office, 2001). The same Congressional study went on to state,
“O&M spending for most types of equipment has not risen in the past decade” (US

Congressional Budget Office, 2001). The declarative statement by the Congressional
Budget Office is not backed up with any calculations, or citations. Evaluation of National
Item Identification Numbers (NIINs) with part specific information aids in either
confirming or disproving the declaration. Raw materials provide a unique ability to
identify changing costs over time because the numbers used are the actual purchased
price of the materials.
The raw materials used on aircraft do not change over time and are identified with
a nine digit NIIN. Table 1 depicts NIIN 004424412, a butterfly valve, used on the C-5.
Tracking individual NIIN costs over time allows for insight of price changes. Using the
example of NIIN 004424412, the average unit NIIN price for the part is plotted over time
and is depicted in Figure 1.
Ideally, price changes in the cost of the NIINs will track with inflation. If the
NIIN cost growth tracks with inflation then there is no additional cost growth above
inflation; however if the costs of the NIINs are increasing at a more rapid rate than
inflation, then that suggests evidence of CGAI.
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Table 1 NIIN Example

NIIN

Description

Airframe

004424412 Butterfly Valve

C-5A

The government agencies are interested in understanding how the cost of raw
materials is changing over time. The quest for better understanding of the changing prices
in raw materials became intensified when the Senate Budget Committee asked the CBO
to analyze defense spending and the extent materials are affecting the growth (US

Congressional Budget Office, 2001). The CBO study went on to explain, “there are few
sources of data on those cost[s] for individual pieces of equipment” (US Congressional

Budget Office, 2001). The lack of insight into the actual cost of equipment and parts
highlights the need for further analysis of specific parts.

NIIN 004424412 Average Unit Cost
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$2,000
$2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Figure 1 NIIN 004424412 Average Unit Cost Over Time in Then-Year Dollars
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This study attempts to provide greater insight into the actual equipment cost over
time, and to examine one potential cause of CGAI. To look at the cost of equipment over
time the research breaks down cost per part, per year, by NIIN. This will provide insight
into the actual cost of parts over time.

Inflation Indices
As discussed earlier, inflation is the general rise in prices for goods and services
over time. The DoD uses inflation indices to estimate and adjust for future costs of
products. For instance, the DoD would use inflation indices to forecast the future costs of
raw materials based on the rising prices caused by inflation. A unique quality about the
DoD’s indices is that it is an attempt to predict future escalation in prices, opposed to
inflation adjustments for social security and retirement pay which focus on prior
information (Military Reform Caucus, 1985). Proper implementation of inflation indices
is key to normalizing cost data for changes in currency value. Proper application of
inflation indices ensures the effects of inflation are not influencing the cost growth.
To ensure the DoD has a proper understanding of the inflation indices the 2009
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) requires the CAPE to
“…periodically assess and update the cost (or inflation) indexes used by the Department
to ensure that such indexes have a sound basis and meet the Department’s needs for
realistic cost estimation” (Horozitz, 2012). Improperly adjusting for effects of inflation
create an incomplete computation of cost growth and can either underestimate or
overestimate the amount of true cost growth (Arena, et al, 1994).
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There are two major uses of DoD inflation indexes; estimating in then-year (TY)
dollars for future budget requirement and calculating real system cost growth. The latter
is often used in identifying Nunn-McCurdy breaches and thresholds (Horozitz, 2012).
Nunn-McCurdy thresholds are designed to trigger action when average procurement unit
cost goes beyond 25 percent of the current estimate, or 50 percent of the original estimate
(DAU, 2010). In order to accurately predict the “most likely or expected full costs” when
budgeting for future costs program managers encourage the use of program-specific
information (Horozitz, 2012). These inflation indexes can differ from OMB’s indexes
because the estimators for the program may choose other indices they believe may more
accurately predict the future growth. These factors could be developed at the program
level and be used to help to reduce the risk of systematically under-funding programs.
Price indexes are intended to adjust for inflation, solely capturing the change in
price at a certain level of function. The index should not capture a change in product
quality, or enhanced/reduced functionality (Horozitz, 2012). This is key to ensuring the
goal of capturing only real CGAI, and not the artificial growth caused by inflation or by
changes in the product.
There is still great uncertainty in how to best capture inflation in DoD programs.
The DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) provides conflicting guidance on
how to account for inflation. First, the FMR states the estimate should “reflect the most
likely or expected full costs,” while the next paragraph states the “price level changes
will be based on data provided by OUSD (Comptroller)” (DoD Financial Management
Regulation, 2008).

14

Calculating the inflation indices to be used in O&M estimating is not a task
handled solely by one organization. Rather, after gathering economic data, OMB works
together with U.S. Department of Treasury, and the President’s Council of Economic
Advisors (CEA) to develop the “Troika” forecast (Wise & Cochran, 2006). The Troika
model is a six-year economic forecast, including the projected inflation rates (Wise &
Cochran, 2006). The development of the DoD inflation rates combines input from several
different sources to help in creating the inflation indices to be used in O&S estimating.
Figure 2 illustrates the process.

Figure 2 Troika Inflation Model

Using this input the OUSD(C) uses weighted averages of the five OMB indexes
to create annual price indexes by DoD appropriation-level. The price indexes handed
down by the OUSD(C) are distributed to DoD Components via guidance memo (Horozitz
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2012). The weighted averages calculation is illustrated in Equation 1 using data provided
in Table 2, which shows the values used for calculating the indices.

Table 2 Composition of Appropriation-Level Inflation Deflators

Appropriation MilPay
(FY10 Outlay)
Military
61%
Personnel
($155.0B)
O&M
($279.7B)
Procurement
($147.2B)
RDT&E
($79.3B)
Military
Construction
($23.8B)
Family
Housing
($3.3B)

CivPay

30%

Fuel

5%

Medical

Other Purchases

8%

31%

12%

53%
100%

11%

<1%

5%
4%

89%
95%

1%

95%

Table 2 shows the process for FY 2010 budget. For instance, 5 percent of total DoD
spending on O&M was for fuel. The calculation of the index is as follows:
Equation 1 Index Calculation for O&M
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It should be noted that a significant amount of total spending is grouped into the
“other purchases” category. The “other purchases” category is simply defined as anything
else that does not fall into the other four categories (Horozitz, 2012). If the category is
not specifically assigned then the single price index is used for all other spending
(Horozitz, 2012). This means that “other purchases” heavily weight the O&M deflators.
Each service then uses the deflators provided by OUSD to produce guidance on
recommended inflation indices.

Aging Aircraft Factors
The average age of the Air Force fleet continues to increase, with an average age
of over 20 years. The steady rise in aircraft age began after WWII and continues to
increase. Figure 3 depicts the escalating average aircraft age since WWII.

Figure 3 Air Force Average Aircraft Age (CBO, 2001)
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Many factors must be accounted for when examining the cost of aging aircraft.
According to the National Research Council, aging aircraft maintenance provides less
stability and may in fact be less predictable (National Research Council, 1997). The
unpredictability added by aging aircraft maintenance costs makes it necessary to examine
the factors that can be accounted for in the O&S estimates.
Age is not the only factor requiring examination when attempting to find the
effects on age for an aircraft. For instance, included within O&S cost estimates are the
operating and maintenance (O&M) personnel costs. The personnel costs is another
component that adds to the overarching O&S costs. The personnel costs could indicate an
increasing cost in personnel above the cost of inflation because the wages aren’t being
adjusted for inflation. Similarly, the cost of goods required in maintenance may be
increasing faster than inflation and indicating an escalation in cost above inflation, when
in fact the incorrect inflation index for the goods may have been used.
In addition to the cost of goods and personnel there are other aging factors that
need examination. For example, a report released by the US CBO found that “Fatigue,
corrosion, and obsolete parts explain why many analysts expect failure rate, maintenance
actions, and associated costs to rise as equipment becomes older” (US Congressional
Budget Office, 2001). The CBO study does not cite these factors as the sole reason for
increasing cost to maintain aircraft, but merely as a potential cause. The study concludes
that if these factors are the cause of rising costs to maintain aircraft then there are benefits
to the early retirement of aircraft.
There are also factors that may falsely adjust the cost to maintain an aircraft that
are not due to age at all. For instance, changes in operation tempo, or war, may increase
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the cost to maintain an aircraft and a source of cost growth above inflation (Greenfield
and Persselin, 2003). The last decade has experienced an increased operations tempo
making it even more difficult to distinguish if the aging aircraft are the cause of CGAI, or
the increased stress on the aircraft.

O&S Estimates
The preferred methodology estimation technique for effects of age on cost is not
uniformly accepted; several methods are currently in use. Currently, the three methods
that are being conducted to test for the affects of age on aircraft are studies based on
average ages and aircraft types over time, studies based on pooled average ages and
aircraft types over time, and studies based on data for individual aircraft (US
Congressional Budget Office, 2001).
According to the US Congressional Budget Office the most credible method for
analyzing the effects of age are the studies that directly attribute the cost to individual
aircraft (US Congressional Budget Office, 2001). The benefit of these studies is the
ability to remove extraneous factors and look at only the cost to maintain the specific
aircraft over a period of time. The studies involving average ages and aircraft types over
time are easier to calculate, but less credible. The limiting factors in these studies are the
changing accounting and data collection techniques (US Congressional Budget Office,
2001). The last study type uses pooled average ages and aircraft over time. The benefit of
this method is the large amount of data and ability to distinguish between aging effects
and other factors. However, the method makes broad assumptions that all aircraft
experience aging effects in the same manner (US Congressional Budget Office, 2001).
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According to the 2007 O&S Cost Estimating Guide, there is little guidance on
how to adjust for inflation, or future cost of the program. The guide merely states, “The
indices used to adjust for inflation should be specified and documented.” (DoD CAIG,
2007). This lack of insight and consistency in estimating for O&S has led to the need to
identify if CGAI exists. The implementation of O&S inflation indices rests heavily on the
responsibility of estimators.

Conclusion
Costs in O&S continue to rise beyond the rates of inflation. There are several
explanations for the rationale behind the increasing costs in O&S. Cost growth above
inflation may stem from the use of inaccurate indices, or unexpected changes in inflation.
One of the difficulties in creating O&S estimates is the reliance on indices that are
predicting an unknown rate of growth. O&S cost growth stemming from inflation indices
not accurately capturing the proper rate of growth is not truly cost growth, but rather,
growth due to inflation.
As aircraft age research indicates the resources required to operate and maintain
also increases. If indeed an aging factor is affecting O&S costs, then more research needs
to be conducted to help analysts account for age in the estimation process. For instance,
personnel cost, fatigue, corrosion, obsolete parts and operations tempo need to be taken
into account during the O&S estimation process. In order to accurately understand the
age effects the other factors must be accounted for appropriately.
This literature review shows the importance placed on creating accurate O&S
estimates by the DoD. The importance is increasing as today’s acquisitions are

20

committing the government to large future obligations in O&S. To best estimate future
O&S costs it is crucial to understand if currently cost growth above inflation exists.
While studies have shown that there is an increasing cost, above the rate of inflation, to
maintain Air Force aircraft there has not been a study of the cost of raw materials. With
raw materials making up over $9.1 billion in spending annually it will be beneficial to the
DoD to find if this is a source of CGAI.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter outlines the methods and procedures for evaluating the existence of
cost growth above inflation in raw materials by examining NIIN costs. The section also
goes into the source of the NIIN data, along with identifying limiting factors of the data.
Setting up the framework and methods that will be used in the analysis of the raw
materials is a significant portion of this chapter. The methodology and guidance set forth
here will ensure the analysis is complete and accurate.

Data Source
The data for this study are obtained from the AFTOC system. The AFTOC system
collects historical Operating and Support costs for Air Force weapons systems. The O&S
costs reported in AFTOC are comprised of both direct costs for programs, along with
some indirect costs. Depending on the weapons system in question, the database can
include historical costs up to 25 years old (Kunc, 2008).
Initially, AFTOC was used to identify Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(MDAP), or Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs (Kunc, 2008). The system
identifies the MDAP programs based on total dollar value of the program. AFTOC strives
to provide routine, timely visibility into costs by providing information on all major
weapon systems, including components (Kunc, 2008). The benefit of the AFTOC system
is the ability to provide information on all appropriations and across all MAJCOMs.
The major benefit of AFTOC data is the numbers are historical, thus only actual
costs incurred by the program. Often estimators face uncertainty trying to predict and
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understand future costs, but using historical cost aids in the evaluation and validity of the
analysis. The AFTOC warehouse combines data from 14 different sources to populate the
historical costs, which include the base supply costs from SBSS (Kunc, 2008). The
advantage of SBSS supplying data to AFTOC is the materiel accounting consists of both
item and financial records (USAF Supply Guide, 2012). Using a historical perspective in
analyzing raw materials allows the data to be analyzed longitudinally. This longitudinal
approach to calculating the changing costs of raw materials provides a unique
perspective. AFTOC allows for a rare ability of comparing actual cost trends to inflation
indices because of the use of actual costs.

Longitudinal Evaluation
This study will evaluate Air Force aircraft base supply actuals for fiscal years
2000 through 2012. The ability to plot and track NIIN prices across time allows for an
evaluation of the changing prices for raw materials. There have many upgrades and
changes to the AFTOC system since its inception. There were several rollouts and phases
in the late 1990s that revamped AFTOC. During the phases new data was added to the
system to include a wider range of systems, all appropriations, all MAJOCOMs and part
identification numbers. The last significant change to AFTOC’s base supply data
occurred in 1999, and for that reason the data in this research is being limited to data
from 2000 through 2012. Using data since the most recent significant rollout helps to
ensure the accuracy and validity of the data being analyzed.
A major benefit of focusing on the data longitudinally is the ability to track the
changing prices by NIIN over years. In addition, evaluating a twelve-year span takes
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away the focus of total ownership cost (TOC), and directs the focus to the changing
prices of materials. Focusing on the bottom-line cost of the program can sidetrack
decision makers from the intended focus of the changing costs in materials over time,
which is the sole focus of this research.

Data Selection
AFTOC is a warehouse of historical costs and information for all ACAT I
programs. The varied set of systems, platforms and programs can initially be intimidating
because of the overwhelming amount of data. The first step is to narrow the focus of the
study to ensure the evaluation data is usable. The data selection criteria begin with
devising criteria to sort the data.
The sorting of data begins by setting selection criteria for the data that will be
evaluated. The first decision is to only include Air Force aircraft. The decision to use
only aircraft stems from the desire to have the platforms as homogeneous as possible to
help eliminate other outside forces that may be affecting the cost of raw materials. The
cost of raw materials between aircraft, spacecraft, and electronic systems may prove to be
so dissimilar that it would deter from the analysis.
There is a desire to compile similar systems for comparison to provide a more
concise evaluation. Dissimilar systems may have a greater affect on the changing cost of
parts than merely the escalation of cost over time. This study limits the analysis to Air
Force aircraft in order to narrow the study. By not limiting the selection to certain
aircraft platforms also allows for evaluation of parts enterprise-wide. Included in the data
are 103 Air Force aircraft platforms. There are so many aircraft platform because AFTOC
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breaks up certain aircraft types into many variants. Table 3 lists the different variants of
the C-5. For the purpose of this study the different aircraft variants are treated as separate
airframes.
Table 3 C-5 Variants

C-5 Variants
C-5
C-5A
C-5B
C-5C
C-5M

Many NIINs evaluated in the study are used on multiple platforms and are not exclusive
to a particular platform. An enterprise-wide evaluation of aircraft NIINs provides a
unique ability to eliminate the effects one particular airframe may have on the cost of
parts.

AFTOC Data
AFTOC allows for O&S actual costs to be broken down by weapon system and
fiscal year (DAU, 2012). The AFTOC data evaluates the supply-side actual costs of the
parts. The parts are identified by a unique, nine digit NIIN. In addition, the AFTOC data
provides a description of each NIIN. The description is an easy reference to identify
parts, and it helps the user to gain more insight into each NIIN. For instance, from Table
4 the description of NIIN 005969637 is “wheel landing gear.”
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The AFTOC data also identifies the airframe the part was used for, and in what
fiscal year. Perhaps the most important information given by AFTOC for each NIIN is
the total demand quantity and total demand cost for the NIIN for each airframe in each
fiscal year. The ability to evaluate the actual costs of the parts is the foundation for
identifying how a NIIN’s price is changes over time. An example of the data from the A10 is shown in Table 4:
Table 4 A-10 AFTOC Data

FY

Aircraft NIIN

NIIN Description

2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

A-10
A-10
A-10
A-10
A-10
A-10
A-10
A-10
A-10
A-10
A-10
A-10

SERVOCYLINDER
WHEEL, LANDING GEAR
SUPPORT,STRUCTURAL COMPONENT
BRUSH ASSEMBLY,PROP
WHEEL,LANDING GEAR
TRANSMITTER,ANGLE OF ATTACK
VALVE,EMERGENCY,BRAKE,LANDING
INDICATOR,RATE OF FLOW
CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY
NAVIGATION SET,TACAN
SERVOCYLINDER
GYROSCOPE,DISPLACEMENT

005917353
005969637
006054570
008625524
009141329
009611971
010030909
010042738
010110502
010121938
010129154
010213681

Quantity Cost
1
28
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2

13,379.10
19,284.37
3,346.58
1,183.19
2,416.26
2,215.99
2,085.28
461.27
9,650.54
2,776.48
10,334.31
31,943.12

The ability to evaluate the actual price per part, by fiscal year, allows the examination of
actual costs. By looking at actual costs over time, analyzing the effects of inflation is
possible and permits the analysis of CGAI caused by raw materials.

Data Limitations
AFTOC
AFTOC reports and allows analysis of historical costs for Air Force weapons
systems, but there are limitations to the system and the data involved. The limitations are
not terminal, but they require consideration on accounting for them. AFTOC provides an
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annual summary of the total supply demand quantities and total cost. The data is not
broken down into individual purchase prices of the NIINs. Without providing individual
purchase prices of each NIIN the individual cost of items will have to be calculated. The
benefit of finding an individual purchase price is it normalizes the quantity and provides a
unit-to-unit comparison. The method used to normalize for quantity will be discussed
later.
AFTOC reports the total NIIN cost for each fiscal year in then-year (TY) dollars.
The cost is reported in TY dollars because that is the total actual cost for the NIINs and
reflects the cost incurred by the government at the time of the purchase. Depicting the
costs in then-year costs provides the ability to apply DoD deflators and examine the costs
in the same base year (BY).
The benefit of transforming the TY costs to BY costs is the ability to evaluate the
DoD deflators. If the DoD deflators were correct, all the BY costs for a particular item
would be equal. This is because the only reason raw materials should cost more is
because of inflation. Ideally, the only difference between the cost of a part purchased one
year from now, and the same part purchased today should be the rise due to inflation.
Figure 4 illustrates what should be expected if quantities did not change and inflation was
the only growth in the cost of the same part year to year, and in the same BY. In this
situation there is a horizontal line that represents the same quantity and price over time.
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Figure 4 No Cost Growth Above Inflation

If CGAI did exist in the raw material of parts, then it would be expected that cost
could increase over time, even when in the same base year. The widening gap between
cost and quantity represents CGAI. Figure 5 illustrates a graphical representation of the
existence of CGAI. If CGAI is present and quantity is constant, then the unit cost of each
NIIN would increase over time. When both the cost and quantity line are horizontal there
is not CGAI present.
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Figure 5 Cost Growth Above Inflation

AFTOC data will be able to provide actual part costs over time to see if after
adjusting for inflation, if the cost of parts is increasing beyond the rate of inflation. An
upward trend in cost per part by fiscal year, insinuates the existence of CGAI in aircraft
parts. CGAI in parts would provide one reason why O&S costs are increasing faster than
inflation.

NIIN
Analyzing all NIINs for all Air Force aircraft produced 668,145 records on 103
different Air Force aircrafts. Combining like NIINs in the same fiscal year provides a
result of 32,765 unique NIINs. The data provided a plethora of data points and many
avenues for evaluation. To ensure the data was analyzed appropriately not all NIINs were
included in the analysis. There were two requirements for inclusion into the final NIIN
29

data set. The NIIN must have a purchase quantity greater than one, and the NIIN had to
be purchased in at least two fiscal years. These requirements for inclusion into the final
data set ensure at least two points are included per NIIN so that a regression could be
performed. Again, the data only included Air Force aircraft base level raw materials
from fiscal years 2000 through 2012.
The final data set included 23,473 unique NIINs. NIINs used for analysis are
limited to only NIINs with at least two positive purchase costs for fiscal years 2000
through 2012 . The criteria are established because several NIINs had negative costs. A
negative quantity, and resulting negative price, occurs when the Air Force returns a sale
(USAF Supply Guide, 2012). A return of sale can occur if the item was purchased for an
off-base customer, or if there is a surplus. Table 5 breaks down the number of fiscal years
NIINs are purchased. For instance, 5,144 NIINs were purchased in all 13 fiscal years
(2000-2012), while only 3,663 NIINs were only purchased in two fiscal years.
Table 5 Number of FYs NIINs Purchased

Number of Years Ordered
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
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Number of NIINS
5144
1264
996
949
1215
1177
1274
1562
1671
1998
2560
3663
7143

Limiting used NIINs to only positive purchase costs in the fiscal year ensured the
data was complete and structured for proper analysis. Using the qualification criteria of
the NIINs limited the evaluation to 23,473 NIINs, or 71.64 percent of the original data.
NIIN 012461643, electronic synthesizer, appeared to have an abnormally large purchase
price in fiscal year 2006, but was still included in the analysis. The reason for inclusion
was the item was not returned within the following six fiscal years, and it is still an actual
cost.

Measuring Raw Material Costs
The identification of O&S costs increasing beyond inflation can be illustrated in
different ways. The focus of this study is on the changing prices by NIIN over time.
There are two ways to measure O&S part costs: costs by airframe, and costs by NIIN.
There are benefits to looking at the data in both forms, along with drawbacks.
Examining the total O&S part costs by airframe allows for easy understanding if
certain total airframe parts cost is increasing each year. Looking at aircraft part costs over
time allows the ability to see if trends across different airframes (i.e. bombers, cargo and
fighters) are affected in the same general trend. While general trends can be examined
between airframes, there is a lack of insight in the cost of the parts. For instance, one
airframe may be demanding a specific part more often because of an increased operations
tempo. A potential way to account for an increasing operations tempo is to normalize for
flight hours. The increasing frequency of use of the aircraft would be the root cause of the
growth, and not rise in prices of the parts beyond inflation.
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To see if the costs of individual parts are increasing above the rate of inflation, it
would be best to examine the cost per part, by fiscal year. This would allow the ability to
compare the average price of parts, per fiscal year, over time. This method allows the
ability to see if the general trends in parts are increasing above inflation. In addition, to
identifying a general trend in CGAI, it also allows the identification of part-specific
CGAI. This method allows insight into which specific parts are experiencing CGAI.
Again, this may not paint a complete picture of the root cause of CGAI, but it can begin
to fill in the gaps.

Identifying NIIN Cost Growth
To find out if individual NIINs are experiencing CGAI enterprise-wide there are
several steps that must take place. This section will outline the steps necessary to evaluate
and confirm the existence of CGAI in raw materials by exploring changes in individual
NIINs. For the purpose of this paper raw materials cost are equivalent to equipment costs.
Average Unit NIIN Cost (AUNC)
The first step in studying the change in cost of NIINs over time is by adjusting for
differing quantities across fiscal years. Differing quantities of NIINs across fiscal years
inaccurately portrays the change in cost over time. Furthermore, because AFTOC does
not provide the individual prices of the NIINs an adjustment is required. Equation 2
demonstrates the method for calculating the average unit NIIN cost for each year.
Equation 2 Average Unit NIIN Cost
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The analysis will focus on the changing average unit NIIN cost over time. The
AUNC is the basis for the upcoming analysis. Using a unit cost removes quantity
uncertainty from the analysis and allows for an accurate comparison of the changing cost.
Base-Year (BY) 2012
The analysis is identifying if there is CGAI in raw materials for Air Force aircraft.
The benefit of comparing the AUNC in the same BY is the effect of inflation has been
removed. By removing the effects of inflation any escalating cost in raw materials is
CGAI.
Table 6 DoD O&M Deflators

Fiscal Year

DoD O&M Deflator

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

80.72
81.86
82.7
84.04
86.12
88.64
91.08
93.28
94.99
96.1
97.15
98.5
100

The DoD O&M inflation indices are used to put all AUNC into BY 2012. Table 6 lists
the DoD deflator values used in putting all data into 2012 BY. Appendix A provides a
table of DoD deflators for all appropriations.
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AUNC Standardization
To continue the process of analyzing the presence of CGAI process in raw
materials it is beneficial to standardize the AUNC. The standardization of the AUNC
helps ensure equal weights of all the inputs in the data set. The NIINs in the data set vary
in both quantity and cost. We have standarized by unit, and now we need to standarzie
by cost.
To standardize the AUNC the first step is to calculate the mean for each NIIN
from 2000 to 2012. The next step in the standardization process is to calculate the
standard deviation for each NIIN for all the data between 2000 and 2012. Once the mean
and standard deviation are calculated the process of standardization can begin. Now,
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation transforms each AUNC. The
result is a standardized average unit cost for each NIIN. The standardized data will aid in
evaluation and is beneficial to the next step in the process.
Regression
Now that the AUNC are all in base-year 2012 dollars, and standardized, the
process of identifying the cost trends begins. A linear regression is performed on all
23,473 NIINs in the data set. The linear regression plots a best-fit linear line through all
the data points for each fiscal year for each NIIN. The data points for each NIIN
represent the AUNC for every fiscal year the NIIN was purchased. Using Equation 3
fiscal year is the independent variable (

and standardized AUNC is the dependent

variable ( .
Equation 3 Regression Equation

34

This equation is calculating the slope (

from the regression. The slope of the equation

represents the trend of the NIIN’s cost growth. A positive number represents growth over
time and the presence of CGAI. A negative value means the costs are decreasing over
time, and a zero slope depicts no cost growth above inflation in the NIIN.
Confidence Interval (CI)
The next step involves creating a confidence interval for

. A 95 percent

confidence interval is created using the slopes found during the regression. We use all
23,473 NIIN slopes for this confidence interval. When creating this confidence interval it
is crucial to identify if zero is represented within the interval. If zero is represented in the
data interval then there is no evidence of cost growth above inflation at 95 percent
confidence.

Summary
The evaluation of how the cost of materials are changing over time and being
affected by inflation is crucial to better understanding CGAI. This section laid out the
sources and limitations of the data, along with selection criteria. Ensuring potential
deficiencies in the data are identified early and a process for dealing with them allows for
insurance the process will not be dictated by deficiencies in the data. This step is key
when evaluating NIIN costs that are changing over time.
Next, this section laid out the methodology for using the data to determine if the
cost of raw materials is changing over time at a greater rate than inflation. The
methodology began with an explanation of the techniques and methods that are used in
analyzing the raw material data to ensure proper analysis. The methodology outlined in
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this section will be used in the proceeding chapter to identify the presence of CGAI in Air
Force NIINs.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the results of the analysis identifying the existence of cost
growth above inflation in Air Force aircraft materials. First, this chapter explores the
calculation of the average cost growth. Second, the discussion leads into the analysis of
regression of the 23,473 NIINs. Third, the results of the confidence interval for the raw
materials are discussed. Parlaying on this information the interpretation of the results
from the analysis is discussed. Using all of these components the results provide a
comprehensive analysis of Cost Growth Above Inflation in raw materials for Air Force
aircraft.
In order to establish the existence of Cost Growth Above Inflation we must show
the trend in AUNC over time. A positive slope illustrates the existence of CGAI, and no
cost growth equates to a slope of zero (horizontal line). If the slope is positive it means
DoD inflation indices are not accurately anticipating inflation.

Average Unit NIIN Cost
It cannot be assumed throughout a fiscal year parts are purchased at the same
price. The data does not provide enough insight into individual purchases, so there is a
need for a common comparison across NIINs. Many NIINs are used across multiple
platforms and throughout multiple fiscal years, so it is imperative to combine all NIINs in
each fiscal year. Again, the combining of like NIINs produced 32,765 unique NIINs
purchased in fiscal years 2000 to 2012.
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The first step in creating an AUNC is summing the total cost of each NIIN during
each fiscal year. Next, the total demand quantities for each NIIN are summed for each
fiscal year. Table 7 illustrates an example of combining total NIIN costs and total NIIN
quantities for fiscal year 2000 for several different NIINs.
Table 7 Calculating Total Demand Quantities and Cost

FY
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

NIIN
12816849
12818470
12818580
12818661
12820281
12821028
12821029
12822882
12823595
12823673
12823674
12823686
12823689
12823703
12824202
12824323
12825330

Total Quantity Sum
19
1
17
10
18
5
3
18
5
6
61
94
1
30
47
47
1

Total Cost Sum
$9,797
$3,793
$55,480
$8,105
$123,925
$134,106
$8,401
$85,030
$40,052
$7,828
$733,591
$96,540
$21,231
$173,039
$14,633
$263,476
$3,889

It does not matter which platform the NIINs were ordered for because this analysis is
enterprise-wide and is focusing on the change in cost of raw materials.
The average unit NIIN, equation 2 in chapter III, cost equation is applied to every
NIIN, for every fiscal year. The AUNC allows for a comparison of changes in then-year
costs across fiscal years and between NIINs. Using the data from Table 7, and the AUNC
equation the AUNC is calculated and is depicted in Table 8. This step is performed for
every NIIN for every fiscal year in the data set.
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Table 8 Calculating Then-Year AUNC

FY
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

NIIN
12816849
12818470
12818580
12818661
12820281
12821028
12821029
12822882
12823595
12823673
12823674
12823686
12823689
12823703
12824202
12824323
12825330

Total Quantity Sum
19
1
17
10
18
5
3
18
5
6
61
94
1
30
47
47
1

Total Cost Sum
$9,797
$3,793
$55,480
$8,105
$123,925
$134,106
$8,401
$85,030
$40,052
$7,828
$733,591
$96,540
$21,231
$173,039
$14,633
$263,476
$3,889

AUNC
$516
$3,793
$3,264
$811
$6,885
$26,821
$2,800
$4,724
$8,010
$1,305
$12,026
$1,027
$21,231
$5,768
$311
$5,606
$3,889

Base-Year 2012 Dollars
Now that every NIIN has an AUNC for every fiscal year the DoD deflators must
be applied. Using the DoD O&M deflators the AUNC for each NIIN are converted to
base-year 2012 dollars. Converting the AUNC to base year 2012 requires dividing
AUNC by the given deflator value. Again, this is done for every NIIN, in each fiscal
year, so we can compare all AUNCs in the same base-year. An example of converting the
AUNC in Table 8 to base-year 2012 is shown in Table 9.

Table 9 Calculating Base-Year 2012 AUNC

FY
2000
2000
2000
2000

NIIN
12816849
12818470
12818580
12818661

AUNC
$516
$3,793
$3,264
$811
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Deflator
80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72

Base 2012 AUNC
$639
$4,699
$4,043
$1,004

2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

12820281
12821028
12821029
12822882
12823595
12823673
12823674
12823686
12823689
12823703
12824202
12824323
12825330

$6,885
$26,821
$2,800
$4,724
$8,010
$1,305
$12,026
$1,027
$21,231
$5,768
$311
$5,606
$3,889

80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72
80.72

$8,529
$33,227
$3,469
$5,852
$9,924
$1,616
$14,899
$1,272
$26,302
$7,146
$386
$6,945
$4,818

Besides calculating the AUNC in base-year 2012 dollars for each NIIN for each fiscal
year, we are able to plot a frequency graph of AUNC. Figure 6 is a frequency plot of the
AUNC for all NIINs. This frequency histogram helps to identify the majority of the
AUNC costs are, relative to each other. It is evident from the histogram that there is
skewing in the data set. It appears there are more raw materials with low AUNCs. As the
AUNC increases there tends to be fewer and fewer NIINs.
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Figure 6 AUNC Frequency Graph

Standardization
With all the AUNC in base-year 2012 dollars the data can be transformed and
standardized. Using SPSS and Excel™ the process of standardizing the AUNC is
possible. First, the mean for each AUNC was calculated for years 2000 through 2012.
The next step is calculating the standard deviation for each NIIN for all the 13 years of
data points in fiscal years 2000 through 2012. Now, all the components required in
standardizing the AUNC in BY 2012 are calculated and can be put together. By
subtracting the mean from the AUNC and dividing it by the standard deviation the data is
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transformed into a standardized AUNC. Again, this step is performed for each NIIN in
the data set. Using the previous examples, Table 10 illustrates the process of
standardizing the AUNC. The standardized AUNC is a result of first subtracting the mean
from “Base 2012 AUNC” and dividing the result by the standard deviation. The outcome
is a standardized AUNC.
FY
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

NIIN
12816849
12818470
12818580
12818661
12820281
12821028
12821029
12822882
12823595
12823673
12823674
12823686
12823689
12823703
12824202
12824323
12825330

Base 2012 AUNC
$639
$4,699
$4,043
$1,004
$8,529
$33,227
$3,469
$5,852
$9,924
$1,616
$14,899
$1,272
$26,302
$7,146
$386
$6,945
$4,818

Mean
1097.429028
4687.256922
8043.742245
6451.985646
10825.14776
36544.07808
28442.5332
17497.16883
6484.847779
15830.03697
7231.316778
2405.753945
9312.849137
18678.44159
372.3633074
16109.86868
6459.396665

Std Deviation
325.9277656
1251.456783
8855.354724
4979.121157
3466.347688
30112.91452
20910.14158
8578.896989
1831.425715
19337.74326
3759.999052
2494.22378
14713.1965
7183.254394
97.49599068
6827.76213
2321.442404

Standardized
AUNC
-1.407184879
0.009351057
-0.451785061
-1.094148398
-0.662371523
-0.110139627
-1.19431728
-1.35739782
1.877684152
-0.735026104
2.039148547
-0.454421881
1.154690116
-1.605510444
0.136829828
-1.342318978
-0.707106781

Regression
Now that each NIIN is in the same base-year dollars (BY 2012) and standardized
the regression of each NIIN is performed. Using the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS) tool a linear regression for each NIIN is performed. This analysis plots
the standardized AUNC of each NIIN as the dependent variable over time (independent
variable). After plotting each data point SPSS calculates a best-fit linear line through the
points. By fitting a line through the point a slope is calculated. The slope represents the
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presence, or absence, of cost growth above inflation for each individual NIIN. A positive
slope represents an upward trend in base-year cost, and thus CGAI. Each year the cost of
raw materials is increasing more than the DoD indices predict. An example of the
commands used to create a linear regression in SPSS is provided in Appendix B.
Performing a regression on each NIIN provides an output of 23,473 slopes.

Confidence Interval
Using the estimated slopes calculated from the linear regressions we are able to
calculate a confidence interval for the entire data set. First, we calculate some descriptive
statistics from the set of slopes. Table 10 provides a summary of some of the meaningful
statistics calculated from all of the slopes.
Table 10 Slope Descriptive Statistics

Max Slope
Min Slope
Mean Slope
Median Slope
Std Dev

8.49
-7.78
1.07
1.33
1.97

Using the information provided in Table 10 it is evident there is slight negative skewness
in the slope. When the mean is less than the slope there is negative skewness in the
distribution. Figure 7 illustrates a frequency histogram of all the slopes. The slight
negative skewness is seen in the histogram, along with the relatively normal distribution
shape.
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Figure 7 Standardized AUNC Growth Coefficient

The information in Table 10 also allows us to calculate a confidence interval. For the
purposes of this study we will calculate at 95 percent confidence interval for the true
slope of all the NIINs. Table 11 provides the information we will use in creating a 95
percent confidence interval.
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Table 11 Confidence Interval Information

Description

Data

α (significance level)

.05

Standard Deviation

1.969591206

Sample Size

23,473

Using this data we are able to calculate the confidence interval using Excel. From
Excel we determine that the 95 percent confidence interval is (1.05,1.09). This interval
tells us that at the 95 percent confidence level zero is not included in the data set. Since
zero is not included in the confidence interval there is a positive trend in the slopes from
the data set. This means there is evidence to suggest at the 95 percent confidence level
there is CGAI in the raw material costs for Air Force Aircraft.

Modified Data Set
The previous results used all data whre there were at least two data points. This
means that as long as each NIIN was purchased in more than one fiscal year the data was
included. This allowed for a linear regression to be performed on the AUNC for each
fiscal year. After completing the analysis on the two or more data points the same
analysis was run on only NIINs purchased in four or more fiscal years. The analysis is
run the exactly same way, but now with 15,252 NIINs (compared to the full data set
which had 23,473 NIINs). The increased requirements did lower the data set by 8,223
NIINs by focusing on NIINs with purchases in at least four fiscal years, the regression
lines may be more stable in comparison to just two or three data points.
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When only looking at four or more fiscal year purchases for each NIIN an interesting
result is found. Previously, when the frequency histogram was drawn for the cost growths
the resulting histogram resembled a normal distribution with a slightly negative skew.
Now, when examining at least four fiscal years the graph changes significantly. The
resulting analysis shows there are no points that have a negative cost growth coefficient.
This means none of the 15,252 parts cost less over time. Figure 8 clearly depicts the
different shape of the growth coefficient frequencies. There are now no negative slopes
and a smaller standard deviation.

Figure 8 Standardized AUNC Growth Coefficient with Four or More Fiscal Years
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Two points were removed during the analysis of the data. The two points cost
growth coefficients were 20,000 times greater than the nearest cost growth coefficient.
The mean of the data set was 26.99 before the two NIINs were removed, and 0.702 once
the two points were removed. Table 12 shows a comparison of the results before and after
the outliers were removed from the data set. Note the large decrease in mean by removing
two data points, or 0.015 percent of the data set.
Table 12 Four or More Fiscal Years: Descriptive Statistics

With Outliers
Max Slope
200690
Min Slope
0.000182876
Mean Slope
26.99287582
Median Slope
0.320531693
Std Deviation
2295.754762

Without Outliers
Max Slope
85.702023
Min Slope
0.000183
Mean Slope
0.702
Median Slope
0.320
Std Deviation
1.839806704

Using the data without outliers from Table 12 we are able to construct a new confidence
interval. The new 95 percent confidence interval is (0.673, 0.731), and once again zero is
not included in the confidence interval. Zero not being in the confidence interval again
illustrates the existence of CGAI in raw materials, but this time with a more refined data
set.

Creating an Adjustment
Using the results from the regression it is evident there is CGAI in raw materials.
To overcome the presence of CGAI it is beneficial to have an adjustment factor. This
adjustment factor benefits both analysts and decision makers. By using an adjustment
factor it helps to ensure the O&S estimates are as accurate as possible and most
accurately depict the future operating environment.
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The process of the identifying an adjustment factor began by drawing from
literature review. From this process several different sources concluded that it appeared
aging aircraft cost 1-3 percent more each year to operate. The first step was adding a
constant adjustment factor to the DoD deflator to apply to raw material O&S estimates. A
constant three percent adjustment factor was added to each fiscal year for 2000-2012.
This adjustment is intended to account for the current CGAI existence in raw materials.
Using the data set containing data from NIINs with purchases in four or more
fiscal years, a new cost growth is constructed. The process is the same as done before, but
now when converting the AUNC to BY 2012 an additional three percent adjustment is
added to the conversion. The process continues as before with calculating the mean and
standard deviation for each NIIN in order to standardize the AUNC. With the newly
standardized AUNC (with an additional deflator) a linear regression is performed. Again,
the slopes from the linear regression represent the growth coefficient for the raw
materials.
Now, with a new set of raw material growth coefficients a frequency histogram is
constructed. Figure 9 illustrates the new histogram of the growth coefficients for NIINs
purchased in four or more fiscal years. Clearly, the additional adjustment to the deflator
has moved the data. Previously, all the growth coefficients were positive and showed a
sharp positive skew to the right of zero. Now, the data is centered on zero and contains
both positive and negative growth.
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Figure 9 Cost Growth Coefficient Frequency Histogram With Adjustment

The cost growth coefficients’ outputs received from the regression allow for an
analysis of the data. Table 13 provides a summary of some of the key descriptive
statistics from the output. With the three percent adjustment factor added to the DoD
deflator the mean of the slope is closer to zero. In addition, using the data in Table 13 a
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new 95 percent confidence interval is constructed and is (-.00411, .02111). This new
confidence interval now includes zero and this means the adjusted values would not show
CGAI.
Table 13 Growth Coefficients with Adjustment Descriptive Statistics

Max Slope
Min Slope
Mean Slope
Median Slope
Std Deviation

11.15
-9.24
0.017
0.033
1.33

This adjustment factor allows for increased accuracy enterprise-wide on the cost of raw
materials and would be beneficial to “big-picture” decision-making. Individual parts may
be less accurate, but enterprise-wide the accuracy is much closer to reality.

Conclusion
This chapter highlighted the key finding of the analysis of CGAI. During the
analysis there were different results depending on which data set was used in the analysis;
however, there is systematic evidence of CGAI in the raw material costs. To further
validate the belief of CGAI in raw materials the data set was rerun using new admission
requirements. Using the more stringent requirements for inclusion the data again
illustrated CGAI, and this time without any negative growth in any of the parts. This
analysis led to the development of an adjustment factor to apply to the DoD deflators. By
applying a constant adjustment to the AUNC a distribution was created. In the new
distribution it was centered on zero, and at the 95 percent confidence contained zero and
reflected no CGAI. Using the results from this analysis the next chapter will summarize
the conclusions of this thesis.
50

V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
This thesis ventured into the uncertainty surrounding cost growth above inflation
by examining the increasing costs of parts in Air Force aircraft. The information garnered
about CGAI will be the basis to guiding future research and exploration into escalating
aircraft O&S costs. This chapter reviews the key findings and limitations of the thesis,
along with recommendations and future research.

Discussion of Results
This thesis set out to answer the following research questions:
1) Are raw material costs a source of CGAI?
2) Do the DoD inflation indices accurately account for inflation?
3) Should an adjustment factor be applied to raw material costs?
This study explored CGAI and attempted to measure the relationship of cost
growth to unaccounted increases in raw material cost. Specifically, we evaluated CGAI
through an analysis of raw material costs from a period of 2000 to 2012 for Air Force
aircraft. If CGAI exists in O&S there will be a large inaccuracy in the total life cycle cost
(LCC) of weapon systems and an inaccurate budget put in place. An inaccurate estimate
of O&S costs lead to budgeting problems and creates future budget issues.
The research concluded raw materials for Air Force aircraft are a source of CGAI.
The presence of CGAI indicates the cost of raw materials are increasing at a greater rate
than the DoD predicted and is leading to cost growth. Furthermore, the DoD deflators are
not accurately capturing the increasing cost of parts over time and require an adjustment.
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By adjusting the DoD deflators at a constant three percent rate allows for a statistically
significant finding of no cost growth above inflation when applied enterprise-wide.

Significance of Research
The ability to analyze actual costs of raw materials over time provided a unique
ability to compare actuals and evaluate any change. By using actual costs and
standardizing for units and cost provided the ability to focus on actual cost growth for
raw materials. Using the DoD deflators allowed for analysis of CGAI in raw materials.
The analysis of raw material parts had not previously been performed and provided new
insight into the accuracy of current DoD inflation indices.
The research showed using actual raw material cost via AFTOC there is CGAI in
raw materials. The evidence was confirmed by performing an analysis on 23,473 NIINs
actual costs during fiscal years 2000-2012. The presence of CGAI in materials was
confirmed when the analysis was rerun using a data set containing NIINs purchased in
four or more fiscal years. This new data set contained 15,252 NIINs and showed no
evidence of negative cost growth in any NIINs.
The evidence of CGAI in raw materials suggest current DoD inflation indices are
not accounting for the rising cost of raw materials over time and need reevaluation. Using
an adjustment factor allowed for a more accurate representation of the rising cost of
aircraft raw materials at an enterprise-level. With improved accuracy on forecasting
rising prices of raw materials allows for more precise O&S cost estimating and improved
information for decision makers. The evidence of CGAI in raw materials for Air Force
aircraft also highlighted a need for future research of CGAI in other areas.
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Recommendations for Future Research
There are several areas where further research can provide useful information.
The first area of future research pertains to more analysis of CGAI in raw materials. In
addition to examining base supply information from SBSS it would be beneficial to
examine contractor support costs. This analysis would require further insight into
contractor logistic support contracts and contractor part usage. In addition, further
research could be done on fine-tuning an adjustment factor for raw materials to apply to
DoD deflators. Potentially each NIIN could create an adjustment factor in order to
provide more insight at the lowest level.
The next area of future research is the presence of CGAI in other areas. In
addition to raw materials there should be analysis on CGAI in personnel costs. With
rising healthcare and personnel costs this could be a contributing factor to rising O&S
costs. An analysis would need to be done into all facets of O&S and find if there is
CGAI.
Lastly, future research can also be done on the DoD inflation indices. It would
beneficial to examine the implementation of the DoD inflation indices by the different
services. Each of the military services uses the DoD inflation rates differently and a more
universal approach could provide further insight into other causes of CGAI.
All of the proposed future research will challenge the current practices within the
cost estimating community. By challenging the current practices future efforts may lead
to more insightful analysis of causes of both CGAI and increasing O&S costs. With
improved accuracy, techniques and knowledge the DoD will better be able to handle
future challenges and fiscal uncertainty.
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Appendix A Department of Defense Deflators
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Appendix B SPSS Regression Commands
GET DATA /TYPE=TXT
/FILE="C:\Users\FerryG\Desktop\AFIT\FinalTable_4oMore_AdjustedANUC.csv"
/ENCODING='Locale'
/DELCASE=LINE
/DELIMITERS=","
/QUALIFIER='"'
/ARRANGEMENT=DELIMITED
/FIRSTCASE=2
/IMPORTCASE=ALL
/VARIABLES=
FY F4.0
NIIN F6.0
Total Demand F7.2
Total_Demand_Cost F10.2
Filter A6
ANUC F8.2
Deflator F5.2
AdjustedANUC F8.2.
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT.
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(Filter = "#N/A").
VARIABLE LABELS filter_$ 'Filter = "#N/A" (FILTER)'.
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'.
FORMATS filter_$ (f1.0).
FILTER BY filter_$.
EXECUTE.
SORT CASES BY NIIN.
SPLIT FILE LAYERED BY NIIN.
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT FY
/METHOD=ENTER AdjustedANUC.
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